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ISince 1941, six Executive Orders have been issued forbidding
Federal government contractors from discriminating against minority
workers.' The latest andstrongest Order, 11246, issued in 1965,
enjoins firms to take affirmative action in recruiting and promoting
minority workers. Contractor firms are required to abide by the Order
in all operations including those unrelated to the performance of
the contract. In principle, all prospective contractors are required
to demonstrate compliance with the law before a contract is let. The
potential penalties are severe: failure to comply with the law may
result in revocation of current coiitracts and suspension of the right
to bid on future contracts.
Despite these provisions, doubts have been raised about the
effectiveness of the Orders. In part, these doubts are based on the
small size of the enforcement staff relative to the population of
potential violators.2 The division of responsibility between the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) and the staffs of the
various Federal departments weakens the enforcement effort. The Order
is imprecise as to the definition of "discrimination" and "affirmative
action." To heighten doubts, before 1971 no firm had its contract
revoked for noncompliance.
Defenders of the Orders cite cases in which contract award
dates have been postponed until firms have taken steps toward compliance
with the law. Competition among contractors has led firms to adopt
affirmative action programs to improve their chances of winning contracts.
In this paper, we investigate these competing claims using data
from 40,445 establishments sampled in 1966 and 1970. For this period,2
. wefind that the employment of black males relative to whitemales
increased 3.3 percent more in firms with governmentcontracts than In
firms without contracts. This comparison controls for theeffect of
employment expansion, variation in the size of firms, and geographical
variation in the supply of labor. Using similarcontrols, we find
little evidence to support the view that the Orders haveimproved the
relative occupational distribution of black workers. We findstrong
evidence that among segregated firms, contractors aremore likely to
integrate than noncontractors.
In the first section of this paper, we distinguish whatcan
be measured from what cannot. We develop a framework tomeasure and
interpret program effects. In the second section we discuss the
design of our sample and present results of an analysis of the random—
ness of this sample. In the third and concluding section, we present
the estimates and discuss their plausibility.
.3
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I.A Framework of Analysis
a. What Is and Is Not Measured
In this study, we attempt to measure the effect of Executive
Order 11246 on the employment and occupational distribution of black
males relative to white males in Federal contractor firms compared to
identical relative measures for blacks innoncontractor firms. Before discussing
specific indices, it is clarifying to consider a problem that plagues
this, and other studies that seek to measure the effect of a program
on its target population.3 Since we have a (two point) time series,
a natural method for assessing the effectiveness of a program is to
measure the change in a suitable index for target firms relative to
the change in the index for the remaining firms. The basic problem
is the absence of a control group in the presence of a program with
economy—wide impact. Although a program may directly affect one
group of firms, it also indirectly affects the remaining group of
firms as well. Accordingly, comparisons of changes in the relative
status of blacks in target and nontarget firms cannot be measured
relative to what might have been in the absence of the program since
that state is not observed. Thus, we cannot measure the contribution
of the Executive Order to improvements in the aggregate relative
status of blacks. Nonetheless, we can measure whether or not the
contract compliance program has had any differential impact on the
two types of firms.
Consider an index of black male relative (to white male) status
measured at time t, S. This index will be defined more precisely4
. below,but for the purposes of the present discussion, itcan be viewed
as an acceptable index of relative black male welfare. Theproportionate
change in this index through time
(1) =St
affords a measure of trend in black economic status. The actual
behavior of St is to be distinguished from the hypothetical behavior
that would have occurred in the absence of theprogram. Proportionate





measuretrends in relative black economic welfare in the absence of the
program.
Index I can be fruitfully decomposed into threecomponents.
Denoting the relative status of blacks in contractor firms at time t by
one measure of the change in relative black status in contractor
firms compared to the hypothetical change in the absence ofa contract is
(3)I = — .
g
t—l
Assuming small changes, we maywrite
(4) in (1 + Ig) =
tg
in S —Ain S.
.5
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Usingobvious notation, a similar index for blacks in noncontractor
firms may be written
(5) ln(i +Ing) 1ng =Ain S —Ain S
If fraction G of black employment is in contractor firms, the observed
total change in the relative position of blacks may be written as
(6) A in St =Ainsh+ G(Ain S —Ain S) + (l—G)(AlnS—AlnS)
= in S1' + GI + (l—G)I t g ng
Equivalently,
(7)AlnStAlnS+G(AlnS_Ain5).
Note that Iand I are meaningful only if black status would be the
ng g
same in both contractor and noncontractor firms in the absence of a
compliance program.
The first component of equation (6) is the change that would
occur in the absence of the program. We cannot measure this component,
nor can we measure I or I .Wecan measure the components of G ng
equation (7). The first component of this equation is the change in
relative black status in noncontractor firms. The second component
measures the difference in the change in black status between
contractor and noncontractor firms weighted by the proportion of
black employment in contractor firms.6
. Ifcontracts were randomly assigned to firms, a simple calcula-
tion of mean changes in contractor and noncontractor firmswould allow
us to estimate the two components of total change in equation (7).
Since random selection is unlikely, an alternativeapproach which is
pursued in this paper is to utilize regression techniques to standardize
for nonrandom changes in the indices for the twotypes of firms.
We postulate the following relationship for firm k:
(8) ln Stk BXtk + ydk + Ctk
where dk is a dummy variable with a value of unity for firmsholding a
government contract in the second period of the data,Xtk is a vector
of control variables, and is a disturbance with the classical
properties. Estimates of "y", weighted by G, yield an estimate of the
second component of equation (7).
The available data put substantial restrictions on theway in
which the quantity S may be measured. Since we do not havewage data,
we must use more approximate measures of black relative economic status.
First, consider the index of occupational position for black workers
whose logarithm is defined by
(9) ln °b =E(B./B)ln P..,
where B./B is the fraction of all black workers in the jthoccupation
and in P. is the logarithm of the mean salary of all workers in the
jth occupation. °b is nothing more than the (geometric) mean salary7
I
thatwould be received by black workers if they were paid the average
wage a white worker within the occupation is paid. °b therefore
reflects only variation in the occupational distribution of black
workers and is nothing more than a method for summarizing the information
available on that distribution. If we define O as the occupational
distribution index for white workers, one possible measure of the
quantity S is the ratio Ob/O. The disadvantage in using this measure
is that it does not reflect the relative number of black workers in an
establishment. An alternative measure of S is (B/W)(Ob/O), which
corrects for this deficiency. (B/W)(Ob/Ow) is the ratio of the total
compensation of black workers to the total compensation of white workers
that would be received if black and white workers were paid the mean
salary that is paid to all workers in each occupation. Defining
S =
(B/W)(Ob/Ow)it follows that in S may be decomposed according to
(10) in S =in(0b/0)+ ln(B/W)
=[(B./B)in P. —E(W./W)in P.,] + in (B/W)
= — (W./W)Jin P. + in B/W,
so that forin S we have
(ii) in S =E[B./B—W./W]in P. + (ln B —inW).
Thus, we decompose the relative wage share into components of
interest in their own right, and perform a separate regression analysis8
.
foreach component. We estimate a separate coefficient for thedummy
"presence of government contract" for each occupation, and for the
relative employment equation. Assuming J occupations, and lettingy.
be the coefficient of the dummy for occupation j, and letting1E be




measures the estimated average difference In the ratio of the payroll
of blacks to the payroll of whites between firms with agovernment
contract and those without, holding other factors constant.
If is positive and statistically significant, government
contracts induce greater relative employment of black males. [f y. is
positive and significant, the presence of a government contract alters
the occupational distribution of black workers relative to white workers
towards greater relative concentration of blacks in occupation j in
contractor firms. The measured occupational shift may arise for
several reasons: internal promotion within existing labor forces,
lateral occupational moves between contractor and noncontractor sectors,
and nonlatera]. moves between sectors.




measures the differential shift in contractor firms, as compared to
noncontractor firms, in the difference between the geometric mean of the9
black male wage distribution and the geometric mean of the white male
wage distribution. Thus is a measure of differential promotion rates
of blacks relative to whites between contractor and noncontractor firms.
Reshuffling of workers between contractor and noncontractor
sectors obscures this measure. A lateral occupational move of a
black from the noncontractor sector to the contractor sector does not
contribute to the improvement of the black workforce that existed before
the contract was let. Accordingly, on this score we cannot strictly inter-
pret I as a relative measure of advancement of black workers. Nonethe-
less, since ma competitive labor market sectoral transfers occur only if
wages are raised in contractor firms, a statistically significant
gives indirect evidence of a rise in black wages relative to white
wages in occupation jforcontractor firms.
Nonlateral reshuffling between contractor and noncontractor
firms has the same unmeasured wage effect. In addition, there is a
promotion (or retardation) effect if the transfer of blacks relative to
the transfer of whites to contractor firms alters pre—transfer
differences between black and white occupational distributions within
contractor firms. If the regression equations are properly specified,
this source of movement in the index I measures the effect of
occupational advancement (or retardation) through transfer.
Of these three sources, only lateral shuffling creates ambiguity
in interpretation. Since we cannot measure the magnitude of the changes
due to each source, we cannot measure the importance of this
component in contributing to the measured total movement of the index.
However, if it is small, the index I weighted by the proportion of10
. postprogram black employment in government contractor firms measures
the direct contribution of the contract complianceprogram to relative
black occupational advancement.
b. Specification of the Regression Relationships
The literature on the employment dynamics of the firmsuggests that
fixity in factors causes firms to gradually adjust current levels andcomposi-
tion of employment to long—run target levels. Weincorporate this idea into
the re2ression eouations and make the further assumption ofseparability
between the dynamic system generating firm racialoccupational
differentials and the equation generating relative employment.
To simplify the notation, we supress subscripts for individual
firms. Let O be a J x 1. vector where the jthrow is the difference












where A is a J x J matrix of partial adjustment coefficients and0
is the long—run level of occupational differentials.
This relationship is exact if firm cost functions for movement
to equilibrium, and for persistence in disequilibrium are quadratic and11
I
ifthe target level, O, does not depend on the costs of adjustment.
Otherwise, the adjustment function may be viewed as an approximation
to the true process of adjustment. Allowing A to be a general matrix,
we explicitly incorporate the notion of interrelated adjustment
processes introduced into the literature by Nadiri andRosen.4
The jth component of O is given by
(14) O = +y.d
where, as before, d is one If a firmhasa government contract and is
zero otherwise. A common set of K variables, 'tX", is assumed to
determine all occupational differentials. With this specification, we
may rewrite equation (13) as
(15) Ut —°t—l
=AX —Ai'd —A0t—l +
where c is a Jxl vector of disturbances, X is a matrix with J identical
columns of the Kxl X vector, and is a JxK matrix whose rows are the
vectors for each of the J relationships, j=1,. .. ,j."i" is a vector
whose jth element is the coefficient of the dummy variable for the jth
long—run relationship. "As" and ltArt are the short—run coefficients.
Since Ut is a column vector of differences in proportions, the
sum of the elements of Ut must be zero (i.e., if I is a Jxl vector of
unit elements, i'U =Ufor all t). This arithmetic relationship
induces an exact linear dependency among the °tl regressors. By
omitting one row of Ut—i' we can avoid exact multicollinearity among12
. theregressors. Less obviously, we can delete any one of the J
equations and estimate both short—run coefficients (A andA) and
long—run coefficients (andF').5
The equation for relative employment isspecified in the same
fashion. Only one lagged dependent variable isinvolved, and
complications from proportionate dependent variablesare avoided. The
regression specification becomes
(16)()— () = + A —A()+ u t t—l t—l
The same control variables are used as those inequation (15). "ut" is
a disturbance with the classical properties. "d" isa dummy variable
indicating presence of a government contract.
To control for variations in local labor marketconditions,
regional measures of firm location are included in the X vector. In
addition,, firm size variables are introduced to control the effect of
variation in technology and the efficiency ofmanagement. Measures
of firm growth and decline are used toseparate the expansionary
effect of government contracts, from the compositional effectwhich is
the focus of this study.
In our data, there are many firms with no black workers. This
forces us to confine our estimation of equations (15) and (16)to firms
with at least one black worker in both sampleyears, and is an important
limitation of our proposed decomposition.
However, we can utilize the remaining data to investigate the
effect of government contract complianceprograms on firm integration. I13
p
Sincethe complete absence of blacks is easily detected, it is likely
that among a group of firms initially segregated in 1966, more government
contractor firms will be integrated in 1970 than noncontractor firms.
By estimating equations which determine the probability of integration
in 1970, we test this hypothesis.
p14
_ . II.The Data
Since 1966, all firms with one hundred employeesor more, and
all firms with a government contract, are requiredto file a report on
the status of their employment by-race and sex for each of thenine
broad Census occupational categories. Thesereports are collected by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and placedon magnetic
tapes (the EEO—l tapes). From these annual samples, it Is possible to
utilize firm identification numbers and geographical codes to match
establishments in successive years. This paper utilizes a matched
sample of 40,445 such establishments which filed reports in 1966 and
1970.
The basic dilemma in matching EEO—l reports for two different
years for a given economic unit is that as we take greater care to
ensure that the two economic units we match are similar in the two
years, we are less likely to complete a successful match. There is
thus a basic trade—off between accuracy of the match and the size of
the sample. On the one hand, we are interested in carefulmatching
so that the characteristics of firms that are difficult to control in
a single cross—section can be controlled by examining the changes from
one period to another for firms that maintain the same values of the
uncontrolled characteristics. On the other hand, some characteristics
of virtually all firms change between one period and another, andwe do
not want to reduce the size of the matched sample because of minor
changes that are probably of little relevance to the analysis.
.15
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Themost basic characteristics on which it is hypothetically
possible to match EEO—l reports are the employer identification
number (El), assigned by the Social Security Administration, and zip
coded address. As it turned out, the 1966 data did not, in fact,
contain zip codes, although the 1970 data did. It was thus not possible
to use a matching device based on this characteristic.
The procedure we adopted was based on the existence of the
appropriate data, although it can be argued on some grounds that it
was a good procedure on its own. Our first step was to aggregate the
reports for 1966 and 1970 by E.I. number and county. This resulted in
the 117,579 reports filed in 1966 being reduced to 98,655 aggregated
units, and the 126,686 reports filed in 1970 being reduced to 96,244
aggregated units (hereafter, "aggregates"). Of these two sets of
aggregaged units we were able to find 40,445 aggregated units that
were common to both years.
The matched sample of aggregated units was thus about forty
percent of all units in the two years. In some ways, however, this is
an underestimate of the extent of success of the matching process
because the successfully matched units tended to be significantly
larger than the unmatched units in the two years. Thus, in 1966 the
98,655 aggregated units represented 25.6 million employees and in 1970
the 96,244 aggregated units represented 28.5 million employees. The
40,445 matched units represented approximately 18.6 million employees,
however, which is 65 percent of all employees covered. Thus, when the
standard of comparison is the extent of employment in the matched units
the success of the matching system is somewhat more impressive.16
. Still,it is of substantial importance to know thereasons for
the failure to match more of the aggregated unitsthan the number
indicated. First, if there is some systematic factorat work, knowledge
concerning it might be helpful in designing a method to securea more
complete match in future work. Second, it is important to understand
the consequences of any systematic factor at workso as to be able to
analyze its effects on the sample's bias.
The ideal method for examining the causes ofmismatching would
be to take a random sample of the units thatwere not matched in each
year and determine the cause for a mismatch in each case. From these
data it would be possible to estimate the fraction of mismatchedcases
due to the variety of factors that may cause a mismatch.6In practice
this ideal procedure was unavailable because of constraints ofboth
time and resources. Given the importance of the problem,however, it
seemed essential to obtain at least some idea of thecauses of non—
response, and so we pursued the problem in the following crude manner.
We first chose a single county to examine in more detailusing the
criterion that it be inexpensive to query the unmatched firms in the
county. Mercer County in New Jersey was chosen for this purpose
because of its representative nature regarding industry andminority
groups.
There were approximately 180 aggregate units in Mercer County
subject to analysis in 1966 and 1970. Of these, 103, or 57 percent of
the aggregate units were mismatched, which is significantlyhigher than
the 40 percent matched nationwide. Tables 1 and 2 list thelargest of
the unmatched units in 1960 and 1970 respectively, along with their
total employment.17
Table 1. Largest unmatched aggregates (1966) in Mercer County.
Name of firm No. of employees
American Cigar Corporation 399
Kayes Tex Manufacturing Corporation 221




Yellow Cab Company 125
Princeton Inn Company 166
Smooth Surface Floor 451
New Jersey Bell Telephone Company Trenton 4,617
H. K. Porter 948
H. D. Lee Company, Inc. 183
State New Jersey Department of Health 730
Automatic Reteiler 242
American Biltrite Rubber 785
National Sponge Cushion 148
Mathematics 58
Electro Mechanical Research 14518 .
Table2. Largest unmatched aggregates (1970) in Mercer County.
Numberof Government
Name offirm employees contract
American Biltrite Rubber 579 Yes
Hill Refrigeration 1,127 Yes
Stauffer Chemical 196 No
Atlantic Thrift Stores 361 No
Dow Jones & Company, Inc. 344 No
Trenton Office 421 Yes
Blakely Laundry Company 174 No
Coodall Rubber Company 786 Yes
Needham's Motor Service, Inc. 177 Yes
AAA Trucking Company 209 No
Oxzyn Company 370 No
Princeton Applied Research Corporation 202 Yes
Applied Logic Corporation 167 Yes
National Sponge Cushion 166 No
Coca Cola 111 Yes
Shoprite 139 No
F.M.C. Chemical Corporation 391 Yes
DeLevalHoiroyd 149 Yes
Ginosof New Jersey 119 No
.19
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Wecontacted some of the larger firms on each list to see if
we could determine why they had not been matched. As it turned out,
the causes could be grouped under three categories: (a) natural
causes, (b) errors, and (c) identification problems.
The three major natural factors causing an inability to match
were:. closing or opening of a new establishment, a decline or increase
in size between the two years so that the obligation to file an EEO—1
form changed, and mergers. For example, Princeton Inn with 166
employees in 1966 closed its doors between 1966 and 1970, so that it
did not appear in the data for 1970; Yellow Cab Co. with 125 employees
in 1966 declined in size to fewer than 100 employees in 1970 so that
it no longer had an obligation to file in 1970. Likewise, Gino's of
New Jersey with 119 employees in 1970 had grown to over 100 employees
between 1966 and 1970 so that it had an obligation to file in 1970 but
not in 1966. Finally, First Trenton Bank with 422 employees in 1966
merged with another bank between 1966 and 1970 so that it no longer
existed as a separate entity. Clearly, each of these cases represents
a situation where the normal growth, decline, and consolidation of firms
results in some firms appearing in one year but not in another. Aside
from changes in reporting requirements, not much could have been done
to match records for firms affected by these factors.
Errors in reporting also accounted for some of the failure to
match firms. In some cases errors were due to the firms themselves,
in other cases the errors were a result of changes in reporting systems
from one year to another, and in still other cases it is not possible
I todetermine the source of the error. For example, Mercer Hospital20
.
hasapparently reported every year except 1970 when its EEO—l formwas
never filed due to a new computerized data processingsystem that was
installed that year and did not functioncorrectly. The most disturbing
unmatched item in Tables 1 and 2 is surely New Jersey BellTelephone
Co. —Trenton, with 4,617 employees in 1966. This unmatched itemis
apparently due to a limitation in the matching program that resulted
from the fact that the Bell System reported ona statewide basis in
1966, but on a county basis in 1970. It was thus not possible to match
the same units in the two years. Only thosereporting units using a
consistent system from year to year would be susceptible ofa match
using the scheme outlined above. Finally, Dow Jones Co. and New Jersey
Department of Health, Trenton, apparently reported in bothyears with
the same name and El number, although their 1970reports did not appearS
on our data tapes. We can only conclude that these reports were either
lost or miscoded at some point.
A final cause of mismatching was the problem of identifying
firms with a unique El number. The Social Security Administration,
which is responsible for administering the El numberingsystem, has
assigned 10,000 to 12,000 more El numbers than there are firms. Thus,
a single firm may have more than one El number and may report using
different El numbers in different years. It is for precisely this
reason that American Biltrite Rubber and National Sponge Cushionappear
in both Tables 1 and 2, even though we report them as being unmatched.
Each of these companies has more than one El number and eachreported
under different El numbers in the two years 1966 and 1970. Since the
El number is one of the criteria for matching, this made it impossible
to match these particular firms.21
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Sucha limited sampling is not adequate, of course, for making
detailed estimates of the proportion of our unmatched firms that are
accounted for by natural causes as against the proportion that are
accounted for by errors and identification problems. From our limited
experience, however, we would guess that perhaps 30 to 60 percent of
the unmatched aggregate units are due to errors or improper identifica-
tion, while the remainder are due to the natural changes in establish-
ments over any four—year period.
In order to explore more systematically the results of the
matching process we computed the multiple regression listed in Table 3.
The purpose of this regression is to provide a systematic summary of
the differences in the industrial, regional and other characteristics
of aggregates as between those that were and were not matched. We
pooled all of the 96,244 aggregates for 1966 and 1970 and created a
dummy dependent variable that took on the value unity if the aggregate
fell in the matched sample of firms and zero if it did not. The
independent variables are sets of industrial, regional, and other
dummy variables. The industrial variables are the set of nine listed
in Table 3 plus a deleted variable for agriculture, fisheries, and
forestry. The regression coefficients are thus interpreted as the
difference between the industry listed in the table and the deleted
industry in the probability that an aggregate from that industry was
matched, holding the other characteristics in the table constant. For
example, Table 3 indicates that holding other things constant, an
aggregate in durable manufacturing was .403 more likely to be matched
than an aggregate in agriculture. Likewise, an aggregate in durable22
Table 3. Estimates of the effect of various factorson the probability
that an aggregate was matched (dependent variable =1if





1. Mining .049 .306 21.1
2. Durable manufacturing .187 .403 30.5
3. Nondurable manufacturing .191 .341 25.8
4. Chemicals and
allied products .091 .333 24.2
5. Transportation, communi-
cation, other public
utilities .240 .272 20.5
6. Wholesale and retail trade .091 .336 24.2
7. Finance, insurance,
real estate .058 .227 15.8
8. Business and other
services, entertainment .078 .298 21.5
9. Public administration .014 .125 2.95
Region (by first digit of
zip code; see key below)
0 .095 .041 5.84
1 .141 .063 9.65
2 .098 —.031 4.48
3 .102 .081 11.8
4 .138 .063 9.64
6 .098 .032 4.58
7 .092 .082 11.6
8 .034 .078 8.15
9 .110 .047 6.94
Inside SMSA .732 .049 13.7
Government contract .425 .065 20.7
Firm size under 100 employees .422 —.205 61.1







O Puerto Rico, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts,
Virgin Islands, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island
1 Pennsylvania, New York, Delaware
2 North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, South Carolina,
Maryland, District of Columbia
3 Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi
4 Kentucky, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio
5 Montana, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota
6 Nebraska, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri
7 Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma
8 Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada
9 California, Alaska, Washington, Hawaii, Oregon
Key to industries




4 Chemicals and allied products
5 Transportation, communication and other public utilities
6 Wholesale and retail trade
7 Finance, insurance and real estate
8 Business and repair service, personal services, entertainment
and recreation
9 Public administration24
. manufacturingwas .062 (=.403—.341)more likely of being matched
than an aggregate in nondurable manufacturing.7There are also ten
regional variables, with the fifth deleted. Theprecise lists of states
in each region are presented in the keyfollowing Table 3 and is based
on the first digit of the zip codes for theaggregates. As before, a
regression coefficient is interpreted as the estimated difference
between the region examined and the deletedregion in the probability
that an aggregate was matched, holding otherthings constant. The
remaining variables are dummy variables for whether the firmwas inside
an SMSA, for whether it had a government contract, and for its size
class.
As can be seen from Table 3, the most important determinantof
whether an aggregate was matched seems to be its size. Firmswith
fewer than 100 employees were .21 less likely to be matchedthan firms
with 100 to 500 employees. Likewise, firms withover 500 employees
were .17 more likely to be matched than firms with 100 to 500employees.
This result is probably not very surprising given thatemployer size is
an important determinant of whether a firm must report inany year.
It suggests that the natural growth and decline of the smaller firms
may be an important determinant of the extent of success of the matching
process, a result previously discussed. Firms inside SMSA's are also
more likely to be matched than firms outside SMSA's, but the size of
this effect is not very large. Perhaps more important, firmswith
government contracts are .065 more likely of being matched than firms
without them. It would be interesting to know the extent to whichthis
difference reflects the fact that government contractors havemore25
p
stringentreporting requirements and the extent to which it reflects
greater care by government contractors in meeting given reporting
requirements. The regional differences do not tend to be very large,
and their direction may be surprising to some readers. For one thing,
there is no obvious tendency for the matching to be less successful in
Southern than in Northern states. Although in simple tabulations there
is substantially less matching in the South than the North, this
apparently results from the failure to hold constant industry, size of
firm, etc. Second, the midwestern states tend to be those where the
matching was poorest, although the differences involved are not dramatic.
Finally, as we have already noted there are some fairly large differences
in the extent of match by industry. Both agriculture and public
administration were industry groups where the matching was especially
poor, but the finance, insurance, and real estate industry group was
also notably less successful than other industry groups. The most
successful matching was in durable and nondurable manufacturing.
Given the few sizable differentials we have noted, however, the remainder
of the industry groups do not differ very much in the success of the
match.
It is clear from these results that the aggregates in our
matched sample are not a random sample of the aggregates we created
from the 1966 and 1970 data. If they were, there would be no significant
differences between the matched and unmatched samples of firms associated
with region, industry, etc. That is, region, industry, and the other
variables in Table 3 would not have a significant effect on the probability
of a match. In fact, these variables have a statistically significant26
. effect.At the same time, it would beeasy to exaggerate both the size
of the effect that these variableshave on the probability ofmatching
and their importance indemonstrating bias. As we haveseen, most
of the effects of the variables inTable 3 on the probability ofa
match can be explained by the variableeffect of the reporting
requirements on whether a firm filed areport in both 1966 and 1970.
Thus, the natural consequence of firmsgrowing and declining about the
100 employee reporting requirementis to induce substantialvariability
in the extent to which someemployers file reports in both years, and
thus in the probability of a match. Onthe other hand, the differences
in probability of matching byregion and industry that we found, and
which would be much more difficultto explain by reference to the
reporting requirements, are relatively small. In theabsence of any
further evidence, therefore, itseems very likely that the most
important systematic determinant of thenon—random character of the
matching is the basic reporting requirements. If thisis the case,
inferences drawn from our matchedsample may not be too different from




a. Estimates of the Components of the Relative Wage Bill
In this section, we report results from estimating equations
(15) and (16). Before presenting the estimates, it is useful to extend
the discussion in Section II to consider potential sources of bias
that may affect our estimates.
One source is due to improper measurement of the government
contract variables. Since the time the first draft of this paper was
written, further study has shown that many firms listed as noncontractors
in fact were contractors.8 Establishments associated with finns
doing government contract work in other establishments frequently did
not report themselves as contractors. Yet, as noted in the introduction,
all plants of a government contractor firm are liable to the provisions
of Executive Order 11246. Since geographically disparate units of the
same firm are treated as separate data points in our analysis, this
source of bias is severe if central managements impose uniform policies
in all plants.
However, it is unlikely that uniform policies are applied to
all establishments. Indeed, it is this presumption which led us to
treat separate geographical units as distinct data points. Nonetheless,
if government contractors advance blacks at a greater rate than
noncontractors, estimates of the government contract effort are biased
downwards, and degrees of freedom are overstated to the extent that
uniform policies apply to some firms. Given the size of the sample
and the number of separate f inns, the potential problem with degrees
of freedom is unlikely to be important.28
. Similarly,potential contractors and recent contractors not
listed as contractors in 1970 are expected to be likemeasured govern-
ment contractors in all but name. Our inability toidentify such firms
leads to a downward bias if these firms have takenaffirmative action.
There are a host of other biases about whichwe have much less
to say. Since reports are filed by the firm, contractor firmsare
more likely to exaggerate their compliance effort in order to avoid
embarrassing investigations. If this is the case, an upward bias is
imparted to our estimates of contract effects. However, it isby no
means obvious that this effect applies only to contractor firms. Since
noncontractor firms with employment less than one hundred arenot
required to report, it Is likely that the sample of noncontractors
includes a biased selection of firms which have takensteps toward
affirmative action, or at least are willing tosay they have.
Another potential source of bias comes fromrestricting our
sample to establishments with at least one black worker. This restric-
tion is dictated by our choice of the decomposition of therelative
wage bill. If contractor firms Initially without black workers contri-
bute to decisive gains in the aggregate relativeoccupational distri-
bution through faster promotion rates, our estimate of the effectof
the compliance progress understates the true effect of theprogram on
the mean difference in occupational distributions of blacksand whites
between contractor and noncontractor firms. Unfortunately, it isnot
possible to determine the importance of this effect. Moreover, it is
equally possible to imagine that the unmeasured firms are more sluggish
in their affirmative action programs than are measured firms.29
Our estimates of equations (15) and (16) are reported in
Table 4. The first column reports the relative employment equation.
The second column is the (log earnings) weighted sum of the detailed
occupational results recorded in columns 3—il. Long—run values,
estimated from the scheme of Appendix A, are presented below the
standard errors for the estimated coefficients. A convenient summary
of these results is reported in Table 5.
In this table we record both long—run and short—run coefficients
for the dummy variables indicating presence of a government contract.
Line 1 contains the estimated difference between the percentage change
in the employment of black male workers and the percentage change in the
employment of white male workers as between firms with and without a
government contract, holding other factors constant. According to
this estimate, black male employment increased by 3.3 percent more
relative to white male employment in firms with government contracts
than in firms without them, and this difference is statistically
significant. The long—run estimate is 12.9 percent. Lines 2 through 10
contain the percentage point differences between firms with and without
government contracts in the change in the percentage of black workers
minus the percentage of white workers in each of the nine occupational
categories available in the EEO—l reporting system data. By definition
these nine percentage point changes must sum to zero, since an increase
in the percentage of black (or white) workers in one occupation implies
a decrease in the percentage of black (or white) workers in some other
occupation. In effect, the estimated coefficients In lines 2—10 of





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5. Estimates of the percent effect of thepresence of a government
contract on the change in the employment and occupational distribu-






1 Total employment 3.307
(2.84)
12.89
































workersover white workers in firms with government contractsreflected
in line 1 was distributed by occupation. As can be seen from the table,
the largest positive difference between those firms with and without
government contracts fell in the operative category. Tooffset this
positive difference, the change in the relative percentage of black
workers in the service worker category was smaller among government
contractors. The other positive coefficients in the table are for
technicians, clerical workers, salesmen, and laborers, although the
former are marginally insignificant statistically and the latter are
essentially zero. The other negative coefficients in the table are
for the managerial, professional, and craft occupations, although only
the former two are statistically significant. Except for a reversal
of sign in the case of craftsmen, the long—run effects preserve the
same pattern as the short—run effects, but are algebraically larger.
In sum, the basic results of Table 5 indicate that the presence
of a government contract in a firm was associated with a statistically
significant and larger increase in the employment of black workers
relative to white workers than was the case in the firms without
government contracts. The increase in the relative employmentof black
workers increased their representation compared to white workers
primarily in the operative occupation, and decreased their relative
representation primarily in the service and professional occupations.
Table 6 summarizes the estimated overall quantitative impact of the
pressure of governmental efforts to increase the portionof black male
workers relative to white male workers. According to these results,
in the short run the governmental effort increased the employment ofLine no. Occupation
Table 6. Estimated partial effect on relativewage bill.
Estimated short—run




1 Total employment 1.654 6.424
2 Officials and managers —.264 —.659
3 Professionals —.529 —1.002
4 Technicians .188 .312
5 Salesmen .042 .0238
6 Clerical workers .238 .614
7 Craftsmen —.107 —.163
8 Operatives 1.59 2.37
9 Laborers .003 .009
10 Service workers —1.059 —1.710
Total employment effect 1.65 6.42
Total occupational distribution
effect .100 —.21





blackworkers relative to white workers by 1.7 percent while in the
long run the increase is 6.4 percent. In contractor firms, the occupa-
tional position of black workers relative to white workers increased
by .1 percent while it is expected to decrease by .2 percent in the
long run. Thus, the governmental effort increased the wage share by
1.8 percent over the 1966 to 1970 period, while this increase is
expected to rise to 6.4 percent in the long run.
It is possible to briefly summarize the effects of the other
variables we examined on the employment and occupational position of
black male workers relative to white male workers. The sets of
variables we examined were a set of regional dummy variables, a variable
equal to unity if the firm was located inside a Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area, a set of variables representing the size in total
employment (in 1970) of the firm, a set of variables representing the
change in total male employment in each of the nine occupational
categories, and the 1966 (lagged) relative position of black workers
in the firm. We first describe the estimated effects of these variables
on the employment of black male workers relative to white male workers
and then the estimated effects of these variables on the relative
occupational position of black workers. As we have observed previously,
the sum of these two effects is the estimated effect of the variable
on the relative share of black wages.
Region appears to be the most important factor associated with
relative employment increases for black workers. In particular, the
relative employment of black workers increased by 20 percent more in
the North Central region of the U.S. than in the South, and by about38
. 18and 26 percent more than in the Northeastor West. Second, there is
no indication that black relative employment changeswere significantly
related to size of firm. Third, the rate ofgrowth of employment of
the firm was negatively related to changes in the relativeemployment
of black workers, although the size of this effectwas very small.
Finally, the growth over 1966 to 1970 in the relative employment of
black workers was smaller in firms where the 1966 ratio of blackto
white employment was highest.
Just as region of location was an important determinant of the
change in the relative employment of black workers, it was also an
important determinant of the change in the relative occupational
position of black workers. In particular, the relative occupational
position of black workers increased by 1.4 percent less in the North
Central region than in the South, and by 2.2 and 1.9percent less than
in the Northeast or West. This suggests that the relativeemployment
increases of black workers in the North Central region were a result
of the migration of black workers from the South. If thesemigrants
were from the lower paying occupational categories in the South, then
their migration would by definition increase the relativeoccupational
distribution of black workers in the South and decrease theiraverage
relative position in the North Central region so long as thein—migrants
were in lower paying occupations than the workers already in the North
Central region. Second, the relative occupational position of black
workers increased significantly less in firms inside of SMSA's than
in firms outside SMSA's. Third, there was little relationship between
firm size and changes in the relative occupational position of black39
I
workers.Fourth, the change in the relative occupational position of
black workers was greater the greater the growth of employment in the
middle level occupations, i.e., sales, clerical, craft, and operative
workers. On the other hand, the growth in the relative occupational
position of black workers was smaller the greater was the growth In
employment of workers in the highest or lowest paying occupations,
I.e., professionals, managers, or laborers. Finally, the increase in
the relative occupational position of black workers was smaller the
greater the relative occupational position of black workers in the
firm in 1966.
b. Integration Effects
The analysis to this point has been performed for only those
firms that contained at least one black and one white employee in
both 1966 and 1970.Since black workers make up only one—eighth
of the population, many firms would not be expected to be "integrated"
in this sense.In fact, of the 40,445 firms in the sample,
only 24,535 contained at least one black and one white male worker.
It is of some interest, therefore, to know what effect the overall
government effort to increase the relative position of black workers
has had on these firms.In order to examine this question we
have estimated linear probability functions using data for those
firms that had no black male worker in 1966 and in which the dependent
variable equals unity if the firm contained at least one male black
worker in 1970, and Is zero otherwise. Table 7 reports the results of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































occupational integration. Since the linear probability model is known
to suffer from important statistical limitations, wecomputed estimates
of these equations using the logit model on a subsample of firms.These
results, reported in Appendix C, demonstrate that If the true integration
probability process Is governed by a logistic disturbance, the linear
probability model provides a reliable guide to the true effects of a
government program.
Table 8 lists the estimated effect of the presence of agovernment
contract on the probability that a firm that was not integrated in 1966
was integrated in 1970. Integration may be defined for the firm as a
whole, and this result is reported in line 1 of the table, or for
each of the separate occupations, and these results are reported in
lines 2—10. As can be seen from the table, the probability was .09
larger that a firm that was not integrated in 1966 would be integrated
in 1970 if the firm had a government contract. The results for the
separate occupations are similar, and in all cases statistically
significant. These results imply that the presence of the overall
government effort significantly increased the extent of Integration In
American industry. Even if the increase in the employment of black
workers is relatively small In each firm so affected, there is a
substantial number of firms Involved so that this effect may notappear
so small when taken in the aggregate.
.43
I
Table8. Estimated effects of the presence of a government contract on
the probability that a firm with no black male worker in 1966
employed at least one black male worker in 1970.
Line no. Occupation Estimated coefficient (t—value)
1 Total employment .089
(12.0)






5 Sales workers —.009
(3.97)








10 Service workers —.011
(2.76)44
__ . Summary
We have used detailed records from the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity tapes for a matched sample of firms in 1966 and 1970 to estimate
the extent to which the change in the position of black male workers
relative to white male workers was greater among firms with contracts
with the Federal government than among firms without such contracts.
Since all of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance efforts to
improve the relative position of black workers operate on firms with
Federal contracts, and since the EEOC's efforts are presumably more
successful with such firms, we concentrate on this issue because it
presumably gives us some indication of the overall impact of government
efforts on changes in the relative position of black workers.
First, we find that the relative employment of black male workers
increased by 3.3 percent more over the period 1966 to 1970 in firms with
government contracts than in firms without government contracts, and
that this difference is statistically significant. The long—run effect
is estimated to be 12.9 percent. Second, we find that in the short run
the relative occupational position of black male workers increased by
.2 percent more in firms with government contracts than in firms without
contracts, but that this difference is not statistically significant.
In the long run, a .4 percent decrease is expected.
The most important factor affecting the change in the relative
position of black male workers in these data appears to be the migration
of black workers to the North Central region of the U.S. Theemployment
of black workers relative to white workers increased byapproximately45
I
20percent more in the North Central region than in any other region of
the country. This migration also resulted in a smaller rate of increase
in the relative occupational position of black male workers in the North
Central region than in any other region, and undoubtedly resulted
because the migration of workers was from the lowest paying occupational
categories. This presumably increased the growth in the relative
occupational position of black male workers outside the North Central
region and decreased this growth inside that region.
Finally, we have investigated the factors that affected the
probability that a firm with no black male worker in 1966 would have
hired at least one such worker by 1970. We find that the probability
that a firm that was not "integrated" in this sense in 1966 was
integrated in 1970 was nearly .1 percent higher in 1970 among firms




Using the notation of Section La, In the text,
i(O — == ' 1X + 1' A rd—' A°t—l + '
whereI is a Jxl vector with unit elements. Thus, forgeneral X, d,
i' A =0
I' A r =0
and
i'A =0.
This Implies that knowledge of the coefficients ofany J —1equations




we may replace the regressors with O, a J—lxl vector. For
convenience suppose the final element of thevector, (Or_i ),Is removed.
The choice of the element to be removed Is inessential.Letting
be a J—lxl vector of unit elements, (is)' O_l =




PartitionAinto [A] whereA is a JxJ—l matrix of coefficients and
C is a column vector. The new equation system is equivalent to
(A—2) 0 0— =AX + A r d —AOl +i' O_l + Ct:
= AX +Ar d —[A—Ci']O1 +
Notefurther that in long—run equilibrium =0)the expected
value of long—run values is
0 =X+rd.
Since i'O =0,it is clear that
(A—3)i' =0 and i'r =0,
where is is a Jxl unity vector. This implies that wemay use precisely








Dropthe final equation and make the appropriate change in
[A—Ci'](i.e., delete its final row) to reach
[ALi —(CA)iA'J
where ALi is a J—l x J—i matrix, and is the final column of A with
its last element deleted, and is a (J—l) x 1 vector of unity elements.
The reduced equation system is
(A—4) —O]
=[ALi—(CA)(iA)t]+ [ALi —(C)(iA)?]rA
A Li.A, Li A —[A—C(i)lot_i +
where O, O, and are the original vectors with the final
element removed.
In general, the matrix in brackets is nonsingular, and estimable.
Accordingly, we can estimate and rA. Using equations (A—3), we
estimate $ and r. Note, however, that A is not estimable without
further information. Note further that while the variance—covariance
matrix of the original system is singular, in the reduced system this
complication is avoided. Thus we have shown that knowledge of any J—l
short—run equations is sufficient to determine both short—run and
long—run coefficients for the control variables and the government
contract variable. Stability of the reduced system of equations
implies stability of the original system. Since the characteristic
roots of the adjustment matrix presented in Table 4 are all less than
one in modulus, the complete system is stable.49
I
APPENDIXB
The previous appendix shows that estimates of A, the adjustment
matrix, are not needed to estimate long—run coeeficients. Nonetheless,
if estimates are available, they provide an additional check on:the
model. Implausibly low rates of adjustment, or implausible orderings
or rates of adjustment will cast doubt on our estimates. Specificity
of training, and length of the training period should cause slower
rates of adjustment in the more skilled occupations.
Without further information, it is impossible to estimate A.
One restriction, overly strong, that will provide identification is the
I assumptionof symmetry for A. A weaker restriction, consistent with
symmetry, is the assumption that
(A—5) Ai =0,
where i is a Jxl vector of ones, with J being the number of occupations.
Since we know that the dependent variable in the J equations must be
zero,
(A—6) i'A =0.
It Is easy to verify that If A Is symmetric, and the last equation
applies, then the previous equation applies as well. It is also easy
to verify that restriction (A—5) allows estimation of A from [A—Ci'].50
. Theempirical results are presented in Table A—i.Reading
down the rows for a given column gives the coefficienton the lagged
difference in proportion for the dependent variabledesignated in the row.
Casual inspection of the table shows that the matrixis remarkably
"close" to symmetry despite the fact thatsymmetry is not an implication
of assumption (A—5). Letting A.. be the elementof A in the ith row




where N is the number of distinct off diagonal elements inthe A matrix
if A is symmetric. The value of the index is .0342 whichindicates a
small average deviation from symmetry.
Reading down the diagonal, the own adjustment coefficient tends
to increase as the skill level decreases,suggesting that adjustments
to final equilibrium are slower for more highly skilledoccupations.
This result is consistent with prior notionson the adjustment rates
of fixed factors. Nonetheless, the implied rates ofadjustment seem
slow, especially when a four year time periodseparates the dependent
variable and its lagged value. First order serial correlation inthe
disturbances of equations (15) will tend to depress the estimatedrates
of adjustment. Moreover, serial correlation will tendto impart
symmetry in the estimated A matrix. Since we have only two points in




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Nonetheless, we conjecture that a lag model is appropriate, although
serial correlation may be present as well. It would be an unlikely
coincidence to find that the ordering of own adjustment coefficients
is so closely in accord with theory if serial correlation were the




Inthe text, we present empirical results on the effect of
contractor status on the racial integration of firms. The analysis is
performed using the linear probability model which is known to suffer
from important defects.9
Accordingly, it is of interest to compare results from this
conceptually defective but computationally effective method with results
from a more attractive statistical model. The logistic model is known
to possess a likelihood function which possesses sufficient statistics,
Thus, it is possible to compute efficient and consistent estimates of the
probability of integration.
Since the logistic technique is computationally more expensive,
we randomly selected a 10 percent sample of the firms used to compute
the results from the linear probability model. Those results are
reported in Table A—2. The rows in this table correspond to the columns
of Table 7 in the text.
For our purposes, the most appropriate comparison is between
the coefficient on the variable "government contract" in the linear
probability model, presented on line 4 within each group, and the
implied probability from the logistic model, presented on line 3. Both
results are computed from the identical subsample of 1420 firms. The
estimates from the two models are quite close, indicating that the
results reported in the text may be taken as good approximations to a
more theoretically desirable econometric model.Table A—2. A comparison of the logistic results with the linear probability model fora



















All. - —2.78 .221 .0982 1.0)6 1.447 1.554
(—10) (3.7) (14)
—.165 .677 —.179 .662 1.01 —.00055
—.641 .051

























Official, —8.55 1.046 .789
(—.0127)
Manager. (—7.2) (4.02) (2.88)
—.3747 .298 .0366 .4872 —1.356 .5849 .71 —.289x103
—.0595 .007)















































































































Sale. Worker,—5.54 .281 .207
(—7.14) (1.76) (1.14) (.252)
.1614 —.71 .101 .333 .474 —.1936 1.41 .55x104
—.135 .0068 .0050
(.111)(—.52) (.203) (.61)(.99) (—.53) (2.53) (.149)
—.0181 .00841 .00581








.00812 .0170 —.00592 .03327.04x10
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*The first line in each group records the logit coefficient, the second is the associated
normal statistic, the third line records the partial derivative of the probability of
integration with respect to the associated variable. This is to be compared with the
coefficient of the linear probability model recorded in the fourth line. The fifth line





1. The material in the introduction draws heavily from
Chapter 4 of R. P. Nathan's excellent Jobs and Civil Rights, prepared
for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Clearinghouse Publication
No. 16, April, 1969.
2.It has been estimated that in March 1967 there were 228
fuiltime professional contract compliance personnel in all government
agencies except the OFCC to investigate 225,000 contractor facilities.
CR. Nathan, op. cit., p. 113.)
3. Readers familiar with the work of H. G. Lewis reported in
Unionism and Relative Wages, Chicago, 1963, will recognize the similarity
in Lewis' methodology and our own.
4. See M. Nadiri and S. Rosen, Interrelated Factor Demand,
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1974.
5. Adiscussionof this point is giveninAppendix A. Witha fairly
mild assumption, It is possible to estimate A as well. This provides a
further check on the model. These results are reported in Appendix B.
6. This would also be a desirable project to undertake for
the entire universe of firms, since it has been estimated that perhaps
only three—fourths of the firms obligated to submit an EEO—l form
actually do so. A periodic audit of a random sample of firms whose
EEO—l forms have not been tabulated would produce estimates of the
causes for non—response in the overall universe of obligated firms and
might have the additional benefit of producing a higher response rate
in the longer run.56
. 7.We are thus treating the results in Table 3as a linear
probability function. There are well known statisticalproblems that
arise from using this procedure. As is also wellknown, the same
computational results may be interpreted as a linear discriminant
function. Under this interpretation a simpletransformation of the
coefficients in Table 3 would make them theweights in a function
that would allow us to predict which of twopopulations an item had
come from, the matched or unmatched groups. In someways the linear
discriminant function would be a betterway to interpret the computations
in Table 3 for the problem we are examining here.
8. This information appears in a letter datedDecember 5, 1973,
from George Travers, Associate Director forPlans, Policies and
Programs, Employment Standards Administration, Office of Federal
Contract Compliance, U.S. Department of Labor, toOrley Ashenfelter.
Travers estimates that in 1971, 28 percent ofgovernment contractors
were listed as noncontractors. Since similar data procedureswere
employed in 1966 and 1970, as in 1971, it is likely that this estimate
applies to our data as well.
9. See, e.g., A. S. Goldberger, EconometricTheory, Wiley,
1964.
.